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Abstract 
This paper reports on unique longitudinal research conducted within a complex multi-
vendor environment in the defence sector and describes the evolving relationship between 
the vendors and the defence client organization as they developed and implemented an 
outsourced HRM application development within Europe. The scale, technical complexity 
and multinational nature of the project drove the formation of a supplier consortium to 
deliver the project. The project was tracked over a period of four years and a contextualised 
process model was applied, focused on the design and configuration phase, to clarify 
complex social processes and to expose the key incidents that framed its evolution. The 
analysis demonstrated the critical nature of initial and antecedent conditions and how 
governance and strict contractual controls interacted to cause project failure. The study 
gives a unique insight into the vendor perspective in an outsourced context and shows how 
the interplay between bargaining and control led to the focal organization shifting between 
collaborative and compliant work processes. 
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Introduction 
Outsourcing is a form of co-operative interfirm relationship where outsourcers transfer to a 
third party the management of part of its operation for an agreed fee (Willcocks and Kern, 
1998, Dibbern et al., 2004). At its broadest level outsourcing can be seen as the contracting 
of any service or activity to a third party who manages the activity under the control of the 
outsourcing buyer (Langfield-Smith and Smith, 2003). Outsourcing can be conceptualised to 
include many of the aspects of strategic alliances (for example Nooteboom et al., 1997, van 
der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000). However, adopting this perspective tends to 
ignore some basic characteristics of outsourcing, that the service is being delivered by a 
vendor under a contract that is time bound with the flow of resources one way from vendor 
to the outsourcer (Belcourt, 2006, Mayer and Teece, 2008). The fixed contract duration, 
where business partners are concentrated on time-bound delivery, focuses the 
collaboration on instrumental goals and restricts the development of diffuse social 
exchanges, trust and relationship building needed, when projects are more uncertain and 
tend to be more developmental in nature (Weber and Mayer, 2011). 
The types of services that are outsourced tend to have different characteristics that 
demand specific approaches in terms of contract management, relationships and 
governance (Cullen et al., 2005). Whilst generic or simple repetitive services, generally 
require standard market contracting, highly specific embedded services demand integrated 
governance and relational contracting (Williamson, 1985). Furthermore, as Cox (2004) 
argued, buyers who fail to account for contextual conditions create contracts and 
governance structures that are 'inappropriate' for the specific contract. Hansen and 
Rasmussen (2013) extended this argument to include supplier expectation to the contextual 
argument, showing that certainty in continuity, cost recovery and on-going new business 
supported cooperation while uncertainty promoted conflict.  
The outsourcing of application development require partners to collaborate in a 
similar way to short-term alliances formed for a ‘pre-determined time’ to deliver a specific 
goal (Bignoux, 2006).  Furthermore, especially in the public sector, they must engage in this 
activity within the context of strict contracting and set timescales. In such circumstances we 
propose that trust and collaborative working practices, which are essential to clarify 
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sometimes vague business requirements, can be inhibited by strict formality and contracting 
especially during the implementation phase (Qi and Chau, 2012).  
In this paper we adopt a process perspective and examine the development of the 
Human Resource Management application through the lens of the sequence and temporal 
order of events that occurred during the project execution. The organisation was a 
corporate defence body in Europe, its defence Agency (Agency) and the main end-user 
department (UserCo) supported by an independent validation and verification (IV&V) 
consultancy from the Netherlands. The IT delivery for the application was contracted to a 
major European IT system integrator (SI) that sub-contracted IT requirements to a relatively 
small specialist software house in the UK (Personsoft), and the testing and validation of the 
software to a company (TestCo) in Romania. We will argue that constrictive governance and 
a focus on compliance throughout the project inhibited understanding of requirements, 
prevented innovation and led to project failure. 
Control and compliance and limitations to trust 
Spekle (2001), within a transaction cost economic framework, proposed that management 
structures 'control and service' how the goals of the organisation will be delivered and that 
different control archetypes are contingent on circumstance. For example, a 'machine 
control' archetype focuses on standardisation, the definition of norms, detailed control and 
'predefined and codified performance targets', whereas information sharing, emergent 
standards, with a low emphasis on 'formal instruments', reflect an 'exploratory control' 
orientation (Spekle, 2001: 437). Extending this idea van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman 
(2000), demonstrated that bureaucratic organisations tend to be controlled by rules, are risk 
averse, and focus on detailed contracts attempting to define and control all contingencies to 
reduce risk, whilst market based organisations tend to rely more on price and less on 
detailed contracts. The authors further suggest that within trust-based relationship 
contracts tend to be socially embedded, contain less contractual detail and focus on process 
controls and the limited use of power. This supports  the view of Langfield-Smith and Smith 
(2003) who demonstrated that social and outcome controls are more indicative of a trust-
based relationship whilst behavioural controls are features of bureaucracies. This reinforces 
the position that significant social aspects exist in all transactions and exchanges are socially 
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embedded, trust strengthens relationships and increases mutual dependency, whereas 
control impedes collaboration (Granovetter, 1985, Nooteboom, 1996). Uzzi (1997: 61) 
further emphasised the embeddedness of social relationships arguing that this is created by 
the 'micro behavioural logic of exchanges… and that, ‘information transfer is more fine-
grained, tacit and holistic' than economic exchanges. The above observations demonstrate 
that increased formalisation tends to impede the development of trust, as formal control 
inhibits social control processes through limiting the informal ad-hoc day-to-day exchanges 
that enables trust to develop (Parker and Russell, 2004). As Weber and Mayer (2011) 
observed ‘preventative’, detailed and strict contracts, with an emphasis on penalties impede 
relational governance, enforce vigilant behaviour and impede social exchange. 
The evolution of exchanges 
Social exchange theory is based on the notion of interpersonal relationships under 
conditions of resource scarcity (Homans, 1958), Blau, 1964). Within this framework trust 
emerges as a result of exchanges over time when exchange obligations are met and there is 
reciprocal action. Social exchanges occur primarily between actors, and are unspecified, 
whereas economic exchange between actors and the market involve previously agreed 
contracted deliverables (Emerson, 1987). Furthermore, social exchanges have emergent 
properties and have a 'memory of previous transactions', for example, power applied in a 
transaction impacts the exchange relationship and in turn the outcome over time. From this 
perspective exchanges are not static, but develop and evolve over time, ‘remember’ past 
experiences, and adapt in relation to how the rules of exchange are understood and applied 
in a specific context (Nooteboom, 1996). The level of mutual dependency is also driven by 
the criticality of the resources as well the shifting nature of ownership during service 
execution. Dependency, power and politics are intertwined and evolve over time by a series 
of interactions (Allen, Kern, Mattison 2002, Heiskanen, Newman 2008). From this 
standpoint, interfirm relations such as outsourcing, create a dependency between the 
parties, which is grounded in the need to control and exchange scarce resources, and as a 
result mutual power relations emerge and evolve (Caniels & Roeleveld, 2009).   
Trust develops during the service creation by a process of adaptation and learning 
and can be seen as a result of expectations being met under conditions of risk (Luhman, 
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1979, Cambetta, 1988). This idea of trust as developmental over time can be refined by 
breaking down trust into the components of contractual, competence and goodwill trust 
(Sako 1992, Daz Teng, 2001). Goodwill trust is seen as characteristic of the development of a 
co-operative developmental environment and a common interest between individuals and 
team members (Kim Langfield-Smith, 2003). However, as Palmentier et al, (2006) observed 
the concept of trust cannot be viewed in isolation from the other relational characteristics in 
an inter-firm alliance, such as power, which provides the context within which adaptation 
can take place. 
The relational context, the interaction of risk, uncertainty and conflict, change how 
the reciprocal actions are structured and how power relations and trust form (Emerson 
1972). Molm (2010), in modelling the structure of exchanges, suggested reciprocity 
engenders higher trust whereas bilateral negotiated exchanges, which are typical in 
contracts, lower trust and affective bonds. In an outsourcing context the service is delivered 
by a vendor and the management of the supplier within the contract process frames the 
relationship and its development over time. The evolution of the service delivery, and 
partner relationships, is a result of a complex interaction between reciprocal and negotiated 
exchanges. An exchange involves cost in both reciprocal and negotiated exchanges and if 
not reciprocated in kind, especially in negotiated exchanges where exchange currency is 
agreed a priori, will cause a partner to reduce effort and cost to a level that ‘balances’ the 
perceived value of the exchange (Molm, 2010). However, this rebalancing of the exchange 
takes place to gain some measure of equivalence and may result in latent resistance, 
opportunism and heightened conflict, especially if this is seen as demonstrating partner 
inflexibility (Molm, 2010).  The distinction between negotiated and reciprocal exchanges 
and the structural impacts on a relationship at a point in time can be extended to 
negotiated, reciprocal and generalised exchanges that occur sequentially. Furthermore, 
considering how the rules of exchanges are understood and applied within the specific 
context of a bi-lateral exchange can inform the evolution of the relationship as well as the 
consequences of this for service delivery (Cropanzano Mitchell, 2005). 
Exchanges that occur during the early stages of contract negotiations, transition and 
the initial performance of the service ‘set the stage’ for later interactions and indicate to the 
supplier how the buyer will approach contract management. Terms and conditions stating 
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pre-calculated cost reductions, 'liquidated damages', and service guarantees, and written 
down in the contract, determine the initial direction of the relationship and moderate 
behaviours as the delivery proceeds. A tight and complex specification in the contract forces 
the supplier into compliance mode with a focus on scope management rather than flexible 
interpretation of requirements (Weber and Mayer, 2011). Expectations of both supplier and 
buyer for the outsourcing relationship arise from these first discussions during negotiations 
where trust is low and there is no history of interaction (Poppo et al, 2008). Initial 
conditions, specifically contract terms, statements of work and governance, can fix the long-
term orientation of the relationship that can prove extremely difficult to change as 
circumstances evolve (Cox et al., 2004).  
There is an apparent contradiction in the desired ideals of collaboration, trust and 
openness in interfirm relationships and the actual contract and real ways of working. 
Exploration is therefore required that explores what is occurring in practice, how 
collaborations are influenced by complex contracts, and how service delivery is moderated 
by critical interactions during the contract management process. This research aims to 
bridge this gap by exploring what occurred in a multiple partner application development 
project in the defence sector and how critical interactions, governance and strict 
contracting, imprinted the ways of working and led to its failure.  
Process Model 
The research took a process perspective focusing on periods of activity, the ‘established 
patterns of interaction (that) may change as a result of specific encounters’ (Newman and 
Robey, 1992: 250). The model is based on punctuated equilibrium, where established 
patterns of activities  are quasi-stable episodes, interrupted by specific encounters or 
incidents that may disrupt and change the prevailing patterns of activities (Van de Ven and 
Marshall, 2005). At these points, the interaction ‘states’ were assessed based on an 
approach by Heiskanen et al (2008) to be: cooperative, preventative/controlled, or 
equivocation, adopting a ‘wait and see’ mode (Newman and Robey, 1992, Robey and 
Newman, 1996, Heiskanen et al., 2008). 
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Research design and data collection 
This is a longitudinal, single case study (Gummerson, 1991, Yin, 1994) using participant 
observation (Waddington, 2004) and documentary analysis of contracts, reports, meeting 
minutes, e-mail discussions, presentations, workshops and project discussions (Rowlinson, 
2004, May, 2005). The research focused on the development of relationships during 
contract negotiations and initial implementation between five collaborative partners in the 
defence industry described in the table below. 
Table 1- Main Organizations within HRM Project 
Note: 1- DefOrg and IT&V played a limited role and this paper focuses on the five main actors: SI, Personsoft, TestCo, Agency and UserCo 
 
The case involved four main locations across Europe, and 28 principal participant actors 
involved in various aspects of the contract and delivery. The case organisations, pivotal 
actors and relationships are shown in the case context diagram (figure 1).  The case was 
monitored for four years from contract bid and award in 2008 until September 2013 when 
the initial operating capability (IOC) delivery was accepted. Research data included all 
contract documentation, design, planning, project management and control documents, 
internal memos and all monitoring reports (highlight and project management) from the 
regular (sometimes weekly) meetings. This data was stored electronically in archive folders 
covering the general project control (13 folders, 535 files), design (12 folders, 675 files), 
Label Description Project Role 
SI A large system integration house based in Europe of around 80,000 
employees operating in 34 countries world-wide. 
Lead contractor responsible for managing the sub-
contractors, quality, supplier project management 
and system integration. 
Personsoft A specialist software house providing scheduling and advanced HRM 
software applications within the defence and health sectors based in UK 
with around 250 employees (around 30 specifically on defence). 
Personsoft provide the software and all aspects of 
the documentation and installation procedures. 
They are the developers of the software. 
TestCo The residual part of a large multinational industrial conglomerate based in 
Europe of around 300,000 employees. They operate in Romania and are 
remains of the old IT division that was taken over by SI in mid-2011. 
Testing of the software, training documentation 
and delivery of training. Responsible for system 
testing and physical delivery of tested software. 
DefOrg The strategic organization managing defence matters within Europe. They 
are responsible in the end for the commissioning of IT projects within 
DefOrg. 
No specific project role – no formal project board 
was evident during contract execution. 
Agency The contracting and procurement organization of DefOrg based in Brussels. Prime contracting part of the client - responsible 
for contract execution, project management, the 
acceptance of deliverables and payments. 
UserCo The end-user department for the software and the organization that 
manages establishment planning and personnel management within the 
operation. They are the main users of the delivered application. 
The department using the software – the source of 
business requirements. Responsible for user 
acceptance testing and deployment into service.  
IT&V The organisation within DefOrg responsible for ensuring integration and 
security for all delivered applications within the organization. 
Responsible for the acceptance of the software as 
being fit to operate on DefOrg’s infrastructure. 
They cover particularly security and integration. 
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emails (4,921) and memos/reports (1389). All data, including extracted emails, was entered 
to a password protected database, nvivo10 and anonymised. In addition to the above data, 
a detailed project diary/log was established and several documented workshops, focus 
groups and semi-structured interviews were also held to debrief and discuss project issues 
and concerns. 
Analysis focused on ways in which the initial contracting and antecedent conditions 
may have influenced the development of relationships, particularly cooperation and 
conflict, and how this impacted upon the delivery over time (Braun and Clarke, 2006, Guest 
et al., 2012). Based on this approach a project timeline and event list was constructed 
(Heiskanen et al., 2008), starting from project inception to acceptance of the Initial 
Operating Capability (IOC) deliverable. Furthermore, critical incidents and episodes of 
activity representing important junctures or turning points within the project that 
significantly affected the outcome were identified (Robey and Newman, 1996). The focus of 
the interaction states was between the supplier and client groups led by Agency broken 
down into more detail where the analysis dictated. At these points, the interaction ‘states’ 
were assessed based on an approach by Heiskanen et al (2008) to be: cooperative, 
preventative/controlled, or equivocation, adopting a ‘wait and see’ mode (Newman and 
Robey, 1992, Robey and Newman, 1996, Heiskanen et al., 2008).  
The reliability of the categorization across the interaction states was assessed by a 
second researcher who independently reviewed the documented events and any conflicts 
were resolved by a joint review of the data (Stiles, 1999). The rigour of this study was 
continually assessed by use of a systematic process of analysis, peer review sessions to 
discuss findings, and checking for data that may disprove the hypotheses being generated 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1994),  validity (or trustworthiness) is supported by use of a real-world, 
longitudinal case, and giving sufficient contextual information in this paper (Alvesson & 
Skoldberg, 2008; Stiles, 1999) as allowed by word-length. Method triangulation was also 
used, where comments in interviews were analysed alongside formal documents, for 
example. The results to be discussed cannot be generalised to all situations but has 
potential transferability (see Shenton, 2004) to cases with complex contractual 
relationships. 
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Results 
This section commences with a review of the initial and antecedent conditions of the HRM 
project that foreshadowed and imprinted the project outcome. We then consider the 
specific encounters and episodes for the requirements validation phase of the outsourcing 
contract in order to demonstrate the link from data to the theoretical constructs in the 
process model. We close with an overview, shown in Table one, of the complete analysis 
over the project IOC timeline. 
Figure 1- Context Diagram HRM Project 
This simplified context diagram illustrates the main actors in the HRM project, their perceived orientation to 
the project, and the relationship lines (only the main interactions shown) the status of their relation during the 
main design and development phases. It demonstrates the sometimes conflictual and ambivalent attitudes to 
both other actors and the project in general. 
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Antecedents to the HRM project 
At the start of the project both the agency and lead supplier had little experience with 
Personsoft the supplier of the software. They had supplied to UserCo (the end-user 
department) a software application with essentially the same functional scope as the HRM 
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software over a period of 10 years. The relationship between Personsoft and UserCo 
throughout this time was characterised as high trust and cooperative as they reacted 
flexibly to UserCo’s requirements in providing an application which supported the core of 
their functional needs covering basic personnel management and establishment planning. 
The working relationship built up over fifteen years between Personsoft and UserCo, 
emphasised flexibility and a willingness to work collaboratively, coupled with a tolerance for 
a lack of formal techniques, such as testing and documentation, with relatively frequent 
software errors and re-work accepted. Contracting for services was also less formal and 
Personsoft were able to bid for software enhancements and extra services on a basis of 
'time and materials' rather than fixed price. This sort of behaviour is characteristic of a 
trusting buyer-supplier relationship (Heiskamen, 2008). The development process in this 
earlier era was geared towards a bespoke tailored application approach and the relationship 
was highly interactive and developmental. 
It was decided at a strategic level of the defence organisation in 2006 to purchase a 
commercial off the shelf (COTS) software application to support an expansion of the scope 
of the business processes being delivered by the user organisation, to cover extra services 
such as training management, and to deploy the services across all of its Head Quarters.  
Agency as the procurement and contracting organisation were instructed to contract for this 
provision and initiated a formal bidding process. However this decision, to go for a COTS 
based solution, had profound implications for the ways of working for Personsoft, as a 
Development Manager observed:  
…we were trying to sell a COTS product in a situation where the history had been 
essentially bespoke (incremental) development. And that dynamic, that dynamic with 
John’s entourage they expected us to be able to do whatever needed to tailor this thing. 
During 2006 Agency began a competitive tender process to deliver the HRM application and 
initiated this based on a set of requirements essentially derived from the experience of 
UserCo, even to the extent of using specific terms from the incumbent application. As was 
stated by the Commercial Manager of Personsoft: 
I suspected that the procurement process would have devolved naturally to one of the big 
ERP HR type of provider. The fact that we were incumbent, the fact that John was there, 
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the fact that he had tailored to some extent the requirements to more explicitly follow the 
capability that they had already installed kind of made it not exactly a no-brainer but 
certainly shifted the goalposts towards us I think. 
As a consequence of their long-standing relationship, and also to maintain tight control of 
the selection process, UserCo encouraged Personsoft to bid for this wider scale application, 
and to seek a supplier partner with sufficient standing with Agency to qualify for the tender 
process. Personsoft as a small independent software house were forced to seek a partner as 
they lacked the technical capability to integrate the application into the complex IT 
landscape of the wider organisation as well as being unable to provide the necessary 
financial guarantees and bonds. 
Entry conditions and the project start-up 
The lead supplier SI and Personsoft formed a partnership to contest the bid, with SI taking 
the role of prime supplier and contract owner, and Personsoft as sub-contractor delivering 
the software. In responding to the bid the consortium offered an extended version of the 
incumbent client-server application, that although technically non-compliant with the 
specification for a full web-based application, offered good functional coverage of the 
requirements from the end user community perspective. Following a successful competitive 
bid process SI and Personsoft signed a back-to-back agreement to deliver the project under 
a formal contract with Agency. 
The delivery of the software under such a contract meant that the parties, 
Personsoft and UserCo, had to adapt their ways of working and operate within the formal 
umbrella of the SI and Agency control procedures respectively. This formal approach 
demanded more rigour, dependability, good quality and well tested software. From this 
perspective, the control processes change (for both Personsoft and UserCo), from a flexible 
relational approach, to a formally controlled and actively managed contract. Within this 
structure the principal contracting partners were Agency and SI who operated in-between 
the old partners UserCo and Personsoft respectively. This implied that the relationship 
between Personsoft and UserCo became formally 'arm’s length' and excluded the more 
social control mechanisms and adaptable behaviour that formerly existed. The informal 
approach was replaced with a strict, ‘preventative’ contract framework that acted to 
minimise risk and control delivery precisely (Poppo and Zhou, 2013). According to the 
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Services Director of Personsoft this led, at an early stage, to attempts to circumvent this 
control: 
We will certainly be supporting an approach which enables us to communicate directly to 
key users without passing through any Agency bottleneck. This is indeed an overhead we 
jointly cannot afford if we are to meet the imposed HRM delivery schedule. And it is the 
way we have worked most successfully with UserCo personnel over many years. 
 
Contractually the project was framed by a strict set of requirements statements of work 
(SOW) covering all aspects of the supply, performance and testing of the application 
encapsulated in document sets hundreds of pages long. Furthermore, project management 
standards, control processes and how the design, testing, documentation and quality 
standards were to be applied were mandated. Functional and non-functional requirements 
of the application software, supporting design documentation, technical and project 
meeting dates and physical software delivery were controlled by a detailed and complex 
contract that emphasised risk reduction, control and a formal arm’s length interaction. This 
contract bound the suppliers to deliver contract line items (CLINS) for a firm fixed price 
against specific milestone dates and subjected them to contract penalties and damages 
should these be exceeded. From this perspective the interaction state at project 
initialisation was one of ‘control’ emphasizing compliance to project deliverables and 
timescales. The supplier side responded to this control orientation by a precise 
interpretation of scope, attempts to reduce the ambiguity and complexity of the 
requirements with continuous challenges to project feasibility that went on throughout the 
development stages. 
Exchanges and Encounters 
Contract Line Items (CLINS), at a strategic level broadly conformed to major project phases 
for example: CLIN1 (Project Management, ongoing throughout the project), CLIN2 
(Requirements), CLIN3 (Design), CLIN4 (Development) and CLIN5 (implementation). Here 
the analysis will be extracted for CLIN 2 to illustrate the link from the raw data to the 
analysis and thus demonstrate changes in interaction states resulting from specific 
encounters. 
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During the project start-up meeting (encounter 1), the contractual conditions were 
reaffirmed and the initial tasks assigned along with the formation of the team. The elapsed 
time from bid submission, contract award to eventual start had been more than three years 
and from requirements definition six years. This meant a substantial risk of requirement 
obsolescence had arisen. At the ‘kick-off’ meeting Agency formally introduced changes to 
the project, including new requirements and a number of requirements were obsoleted (no 
longer required) and announced that this new situation formed the basis of the validation 
(encounter 2). This intervention fundamentally breached the assumptions behind the 
delivery of a COTS solution, as the new requirements required a different more 
developmental approach and started a train of events that framed the ongoing project. 
From the Personsoft Project Managers perspective: 
There seemed to be a basic contradiction in the contract …the requirements (were) based 
on the assumption of a COTS package to reduce the risk et cetera by buying something off 
the shelf. Bespoke was not really tied in – and then you look at all the methods, the 
approaches were contradictory. We never, I don’t think we ever got over this, we were 
forever arguing, and I mean every single meeting, was this distinction about what we had 
to do and what was actually required. 
From Agency's perspective these new requirements did not substantially exceed the 
application design requirements in terms of function and could be assumed to be 
reasonably covered within the bid Statement of Work (SOW). Furthermore, as the basis of 
HRM was the old application, substantial portions of the new requirements were offset in 
their view by ‘already implemented functions and expected more HRM requirements to be 
covered’ [Agency, Project Manager] and were ‘suspicious’ and ‘mistrustful’ [SI, Quality 
Manager] of attempts by the supplier to increase scope. Indeed the Agency Contract 
Manager stated that: 
According to our interpretation, these changes should be cost neutral, so no authorization 
for extra funding will be necessary, and thus (also) precluding a significant impact (on the 
project schedule). 
 
These new requirements needed further specification - compared to those covered within 
the statement of work (SOW) and requirements based on the incumbent application. They 
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would need substantial validation and design work in the view of the software supplier’s 
Services Director: 
Please also be aware that these new requirements … are very substantial, and that 
Agency comments of there ‘seems to be very little change’, and’ (the scope) includes 
these SR’s’, this assessment is very very wrong. 
 
Despite this, the starting position of Agency was that no major impact in cost or time was 
expected from the requirements review process, and consequently the interaction state 
between the participants during ‘encounter 1’ is assessed as ‘control’. 
This control orientation was carried forward to ‘episode 1’. Whilst formal project channels 
were defined, continuous discussions took place about the need for direct contacts between 
Personsoft and UserCo, the need to circumvent formal project interfaces and re-establish 
previous ways of working. This initiated controlling actions from the Agency project 
manager who ‘reacted angrily when he saw an e-mail sent directly by John (to UserCo), 
which was not the defined channel’ [Project Manager SI] when analysts from Personsoft 
contacted and arranged meetings with UserCo directly and outside of SI and Agency control. 
This prompted a response from the Services Director at Personsoft: 
As we discussed many times together during the Bid, the current plan is impossible to 
meet and we therefore need to force through better and more efficient ways of working, 
or we will all fail. We need direct access to the end users. 
 
This process was illustrative of a conflictual relationship during the early stages of the 
requirements clarification (episode 1) where a tension arose between Personsoft’s desire to 
reproduce early modes of working with UserCo and the principal contract partners, Agency 
and SI, enforcing a strictly contractual form of governance and an ‘arms-length’ relation 
between developers and users. A problem understood by the UserCo Senior Manager: 
… we understand the SI’s concern that the drivers of the business processes are mostly the 
end-users. They are the ones who can really define the operational sequences they run by 
exploitation of the various functionalities offered by the software. 
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Furthermore, the early requirements workshops took on much of the characteristics of a re-
negotiation and restatement of project objectives with Suppliers trying to prove an 
extension to overall project scope (and thus cost) whereas clients sought to minimise any 
project impact from the new requirements. They were focused on maintaining project scope 
and timescales, and probed the extent to which offset was possible from already delivered 
functions in the application, to avoid threats to the fixed price. 
This pattern of behaviour continued throughout the validation process, and several 
iterations of the agreed requirements list, as well as in the impact statement needed to 
underpin a contract amendment. The exit from this process was ‘encounter 3’, the contract 
amendment required to change project scope. The interaction state of ‘control’ reflecting 
the contractual and negotiated nature of this activity and its formal role in codifying and 
crystallising the negotiations that took place during ‘episode 1’ and representing  the 
inherent power dynamics of a contract negotiation. This interaction state (control) now 
forms the entry interaction status for the next set of activities beginning with ‘episode 3’ the 
design approach. This cyclic pattern of encounter and episodes repeats throughout the 
process model and full analysis of the events and interaction states for the IOC 
implementation of HRM from start-up to final acceptance is shown as Table 1. 
The root causes of failure 
The HRM project, in effect, delivered only an upgrade of the existing application along with 
a limited set of new requirements introduced during the project start. Interfacing, 
integration within the DEFORG systems, self-service functionality and most of the workflow 
required at IOC were either obsoleted or put off until full operating capability (FOC). System 
implementation was scheduled for ten months from effective date of contract but actually 
took seventeen months and cost overruns on the supplier side were 100% for all supplier 
partners. The origin of this failure occurred during the first six months of this project and the 
root cause of this failure was a fundamental mismatch between the culture of Personsoft 
that emphasised informality and collaboration compared to that required by the HRM 
project which emphasised strict control. 
This mismatch was exposed throughout the trajectory of the project. Firstly, in the 
creation of information schemas, software development plans system and security design 
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specifications, test plans and system implementation plans and the system design plan. The 
creation of all of these contracted documents (episodes, 4, 5 and 6) was subject to dispute, 
continuous revisions and rework due to poor quality, which caused friction regarding 
responsibility for creation within the suppliers and conflict between suppliers and clients in 
what was seen by Agency as a critical and essential component in their risk reduction 
approach but as an onerous effort by SI. In particular, Personsoft found the documentation 
problematic throughout the project resulting from its long term culture that did not 
emphasise formal controls or documentation and as a result many of the standard 
documents that would be expected simply did not exist at project start. An analyst 
commented, ‘For UserCo, life is easy because they understand the systems makeup and how 
it works and are thankfully free of rigorous processes’. 
Figure 2- HRM project timeline 
This figure shows the evolution of the timeline for the project from inception to initial acceptance of the 
installed software in late 2012. It shows two main periods of delay the first caused by the immature status of 
the requirements and the bug fixing and corrections needed following software delivery. Both these factors 
can be traced back to the rushed nature of the requirements validation during the first two months of the 
project.  
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All documentation was late and especially the design specification in the form of Use Case 
diagramming for the new requirements. This last item, and its creation, was the primary 
cause of the failure to meet the design specification milestone (critical design review CDR, 
during encounter 9) and the inability to settle and agree functionality. Initially the design 
specification at a formal project level failed and a direct workshop approach between 
Personsoft and UserCo was permitted. This allowed a more direct collaborative approach 
(episode 3) between Personsoft and UserCo more consistent with their previous working 
relationship but added project delays due to the iterative nature of exploratory 
requirements gathering that was needed. 
To avoid the knock on effects on software development as a result of delays in the design 
specification Personsoft preceded, at risk, with the software configuration in parallel with an 
ongoing design specification and before the final design was stabilised and agreed. 
Increasingly, changes in requirement, maturation in ideas and some backtracking meant 
divergence between software development and business requirements occurred. This 
caused substantial development rework, continuous documentation revision and as a result, 
a loss in capacity and rejection of the design by Agency. Furthermore, constant changes to 
the configured software, immature release and testing procedures introduced substantial 
errors which were reflected in the number of releases (episodes 8, 9) and patches necessary 
to meet the first software delivery. In addition, the poor quality and error ridden underlying 
COTS software was also exposed during UAT (episode 11) resulting in UAT rejection 
(encounter 12) and substantial rework.  
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Figure 3- Event Chart Encounters and Episodes 
 
Discussion 
This research demonstrates the critical nature of initial conditions and the processes and 
exchanges that occur in an IT ‘collaborative’ context and how the patterns of interactions 
between the parties are ‘cyclical not sequential’ (Ring and van de Ven, 1994). The analysis 
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supports the view  that initial conditions and antecedents foreshadow outcomes, and 
‘imprint’ a trajectory  that can prove difficult to change or challenge, and can ultimately lead 
to project failure (Doz, 1996). The history of the relation and the ‘shadow of the future’ 
plays a role in trust, expectations and relationship building (Poppo et al., 2008). It also 
supports the view that tight contracts focused on ‘safeguarding’ or ‘prevention’ reduces the 
opportunity for cooperation in outsourcing contractual engagements (Parmigiani and 
Rivera-Santos, 2011, Poppo and Zhou, 2013).  
The contract was signed under the assumption of a commercial off the shelf (COTS) 
delivered application intended to minimise scope drift and project risk. In such approaches 
the requirement and business processes are assumed fixed and known and contracting 
proceeds focused on compliance, and interactions are broadly regulated by negotiated 
exchanges. The introduction of new requirements into a fixed price and scope project where 
the requirements were apparently settled meant the process of revalidation had to be 
flexible and more exploratory. These new requirements extended the functional scope of 
the existing application as well as leading the user community into new unknown business 
areas. Such factors suggested that a more developmental, incremental and collaborative 
approach was required. This was partially achieved by initiating workshop processes, 
however, the contractual framework continued as if nothing had happened, and focused on 
‘regulating behaviour’ rather than goal achievement (Weber and Mayer, 2011).  
Although a precise contract as proposed by Cong and Chau (2007) is essential in the 
early stages of project, where there is uncertainty and limited history between the 
contracting parties, an over focus on contractual compliance during delivery can hinder or 
impede the development of relationships that allow supplier flexibility (Kim et al., 2013). In 
complex real-world outsourcing projects, as shown here, there is always a mix of negotiated 
and reciprocal exchanges that are integrated and inseparable. The project, at times, will 
demand developmental approaches where users and software developers share knowledge 
and experience to make sense of the business domain. From this understanding developers 
could model a solution accounting for application capabilities and limitations compared to 
what is expected by the users. In essence, developmental approaches are about integrating 
different perspectives into a solution; however, where a contractual deliverable, with fixed 
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terms and outcomes, is interposed within a developmental process there is a mismatch and 
conflict.  
At stages within the project, when work practices shifted towards a more reciprocal 
exchange, supportive of a developmental exploratory approach, developers and users were 
able to cooperate and achieve reasonable agreement on the design. The impact of a 
looming project deadline fixed on the assumptions of COTS development was to truncate 
this process and furthermore resulted in the software house proceeding at risk when the 
design was not fixed or stabilised. This resulted in an ever widening gap between the 
delivered functionality and the desired end state as a result of the software design being 
continually in a state of flux during the entire software configuration phase.  
A Model of Service Interaction at HRM 
Cropanzo and Michell, (2005), distinguished between types of exchange and the exchange 
relationship drawing attention to the conflation of exchange as the relationship, and a 
relationship as a consequence of the exchanges. Based on Foa and Foa's (1971) model they 
pointed out that real world interfirm relationships involve 'myriads' of exchanges and that 
'parties can exchange different things in different ways' at different times (Cropanzo and 
Michell, 2005 p887). This suggests that if the relationship between parties is moulded by the 
nature of the exchange this would be constantly evolving and adapting as different types of 
exchange occur. Furthermore, as exchanges are not discrete transactions but are series of 
interactions that take place in the 'course of time' the outcome of one exchange becomes 
the input for the next and by this means the current transaction becomes embedded in a 
historical sequence of events (Molm, 2010). From this perspective transactions have 
memory of the past and the relationship can cycle through quasi-stable periods between 
collaboration and control dependent on the relationship attributes demanded by the service 
delivery at that point in time. 
In the HRM project, exchanges took place over an extended period of time during 
the course of service delivery and involved both contracted and social resources. Based on 
the above discussion we can conceptually separate the rules and control characteristics of 
the exchange from the nature of the relationship (Meeker, 1971). The rationale for this is 
where high levels of shared knowledge or periods of innovation are important, social and 
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trust based control and reciprocal action dominate (Li, 2011, Blumenberg, Wagner 2009). 
For example, high uncertainty exploratory development in a project suggests an interactive 
approach would be required whereas for low uncertainty situations an arm’s length 
approach would be more appropriate. This split characterises the relationship as either 
predominately a social exchange or economic exchange, respectively. The types of exchange 
occurring divide between negotiated and contracted deliverables, which imply a more 
directive contract management approach, to collaborative and relational, where a degree of 
interaction and knowledge sharing is needed. This split characterises the exchange as either 
predominantly a social or economic exchange respectively. Based on Cropanzano and 
Mitchell (2005) this conceptual division of exchange and relationship characteristics, along 
with a mapping of principal service activities is shown in figure 3. 
Figure 4- Exchange Model HRM Project 
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that would need inter-dependence and bi-lateral coordination (Parmingiani and Rivera-
Santos, 2011). Furthermore, those deliverables that involved intangible knowledge assets, 
such as how business processes work, definition or design, needed repeated interaction 
exchanges and experimentation (Collins and Hitt, 2006, Inkpen, 2008). When the transaction 
is reciprocal, such as in sharing information, this matches the relationship characteristic, 
trust building and knowledge sharing is promoted and social control should prevail (cell A, 
Fig 3). Low uncertainty, in scope and definition implies an arm’s length economic exchange 
relationship and collaboration is assumed unnecessary. In this case where the actual 
exchange is also economic (involves concrete deliverables) there is a 'match' (cell D, Fig 3) 
and there is coherence between the exchange relation and the actual exchange itself and 
formal control prevails (Cropanzano and Mitchell (2005). 
When there is an assumed arm’s length relationship and the actual exchange is a 
social and reciprocal then there is a mismatch (cell C, Fig 3). This occurred several times 
during the project when Personsoft attempted to collaboratively develop and question what 
were assumed by the other parties’ standard already delivered and contracted components 
of the project. This was for the other parties a serious breach of trust and a 'betrayal' and 
put into question the whole basis of Personsoft’s competence to deliver. It also put great 
stress on the internal organisation as developers felt frustrated and constrained by the 
arm’s length approach. A high uncertainty implies an interactive process is needed and 
where formal controls and contract milestones are applied the actual exchange is primarily 
economic (cell B, Fig 3). Developmental and collaborative processes take more time and 
imposed contractual milestones limit the interaction and promote superficial analysis. This 
resulted in lack of clarity throughout the project that promoted the conflict over meaning 
and interpretation that underpinned its failure. The application of contractual control 
extended even when a nominal collaborative approach was allowed (cell A, Fig 3). Bespoke 
development had to conform to contracted timescales nevertheless and the failure here on 
the contractual element of deliverable had a severe impact on trust and relationships 
between the parties. 
From this discussion we can propose that this project demonstrates the 
heterogeneous nature of complex application development needs contingent management 
and relational governance approaches over the project phases (Williamson, 1985).  From 
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this case study, as well as the usefulness of focusing on social exchange as an explanatory 
framework, it can be seen that different exchange protocols prevail at different times of the 
project. Furthermore, spillover from one type of exchange to another frame the relationship 
development over time, and complete separation of social and negotiated exchanges is 
difficult conceptually and practically in the real cut and thrust of a specific work context. 
Conclusion and implications for practice 
In the HRM project many of the problems that arose, including poor quality software 
development and lack of processes, can be linked back to a culture that emphasized 
flexibility over rigour. This is indicative of a way of working going back years that was 
mismatched to the new service need. The acceptance of a non-compliant application by 
Agency demonstrated weak vendor selection processes not focused on the essentials and a 
failure to apply rigorous due diligence (Pai and Basu, 2007). Furthermore, the contradiction 
between having a ‘tight’ arm’s length procurement relationship whilst needing a flexible 
response from suppliers, in outsourcing where complex interaction is needed to solve 
problems, has been demonstrated,  and implies governance, service delivery and the 
characteristics of the service must match (Joskow, 1988).  
 
Limitations 
Although a single case in a specific sector cannot be generalised to all collaborations the 
detailed understanding of the real world context of this case gained over a longitudinal 
study of four years enables us to move away from simplistic rule based logic towards 
effective knowledge acquisition and understanding (Flyvberg, 2004). Our findings do suggest 
that much can be learned about such relationships, the influence of context, antecedent 
conditions and the problems of co-ordinating diverse interests in heterogeneous service 
supply networks. In the Defence setting in particular, forcing suppliers to work closely to 
tight fixed price contracts can inhibit service innovation, especially when more flexible 
approaches to development are demanded. 
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Table 2 - Event History HRM Project 
Event Description of the event Interaction 
state 
 
En1 Project kick off meeting at system integrator offices in Brussels. Control Contractual commitments and 
consequences of service failure. 
Ep1 Agreement and discussion on project governance, timelines and approach to requirement 
validation. 
Control Negotiation- buyers maintaining 
suppliers seeking to extend scope. 
En2 Formal introduction of project amendment to requirement covering functional coverage of 
new business area. 
Control But equivocation by Personsoft as 
feasibility doubted. 
Ep2 Creation of requirements traceability matrix and assessment by suppliers – including 
candidate requirements introduced at kick-off workshop. 
Control Emphasis on compliance to the 
bid specifics by SI. 
En3 Requirements specification and negotiation/trading workshops to assess impact and scope 
of change. Output was impact statement including financial consequences. 
Control Negotiation - Agency emphasising 
continued SOW compliance. 
Ep3 Joint technical reviews and internal supplier review mapping requirements current 
functional capability. 
Control Continuous negotiation and 
probing for compliance. 
En4 Design requirements workshops and refinement of the design approach. Number and type 
of Use Cases, scope of documentation, restriction to new requirements and design rules 
agreed. Access to resources and the responsibility user specified. 
Control  Progress slow and delay becoming 
evident. 
Ep4 Joint technical reviews and workshops to create use cases describing business processes 
and application interaction. 
Equivocation Agency accepting change of 
approach reluctantly. 
En5 Decision to change approach resulting from delays and slow progress in determining 
business process and how this was to be modelled in the application. 
Equivocation Direct Personsoft to UserCo 
approach structured. 
Ep5 Interactive design directly between Personsoft and UserCo allowed, creation process maps, 
flow diagrams, Use Cases and walkthroughs and story boards of concept functional delivery. 
 
Cooperative Some limitations in access to user 
resources such as subject matter 
experts. 
En6 Presentation of outcomes of design workshops/events to lead developer Personsoft by 
senior analyst – delivery of interim functional specifications and Use Cases. 
Cooperative Design was incomplete and 
unstable ongoing modification. 
Ep6 Continued refinement of the design use cases – ongoing and iterative. Cooperative Continuous and iterative 
refinement of business need. 
En7 Preliminary design review meeting first version design presented but not accepted as design 
not yet stable and documentation incomplete. 
Cooperative But equivocation by SI and 
Agency. 
Ep7 Mapping of requirements and new functional areas agreed at Personsoft internal meeting – 
walk-throughs and discussion of design implications from preliminary design review. 
Cooperative But ongoing equivocation by SI 
and Agency. 
En8 Configuration of HRM COTS package to cover new requirements - started at risk and before 
final design stabilised.  
Cooperative But equivocation as process and 
quality invisible to Agency & SI. 
Ep8 Creation of multiple releases due to poor software and ongoing changing requirements 
added to internal test and acceptance burden. 
Cooperative Increasing unease at SI, TestCo 
and Agency. 
En9 Delivery of Release for factory acceptance testing (FAT) to supplier SI and TestCo Romania. Cooperative Equivocation at SI, TestCo and 
Agency. 
Ep9 Testing of release HRM on FAT, Reference System (SAT) and initial UAT to check for user 
configuration compatibility. Fat test run – interrupted by preparation failure re-run broadly 
successful. 
Cooperative/ 
Equivocation 
Emerging problems with security 
during testing – growing unease. 
En10 Formal failure of factory and system acceptance test and demand for a ‘cure’ plan by 
agency. 
Control Formal letter to SI from Agency re 
notification delay. 
Ep10 Reconfiguration application and correction of vital and critical security deficiencies from 
core application and incorporated workflow software. Repeated new baseline(s).  
Control SI ‘cure plan’ and weekly on-line 
update and progress meetings. 
En11 SAT re-run including a re-run of security integration test and validation routines – new 
security failures. Start of initial UAT testing after delay. 
Control Detailed and careful assessment 
of deliverables by SI and Agency 
Ep11 UAT and acceptance testing including a re-run of security integration test and validation 
routines. UAT test started including a full regression over all the COTS core application. 
Control Detailed test scripts covering full 
scope application Personsoft put 
at arm’s length. 
En12 Notification of UAT failure from full regression test at PCR 15 Control Control: UAT test revealed large 
number errors in core COTS 
package going back years. 
Ep12 Reconfiguration application and correction of vital and critical security deficiencies – update 
all documentation and preparation new baselines.  
Control Bi weekly meetings and careful 
control of deliverables by SI. 
En13 Delivery Release for re-testing and rework of core application deficiencies – near iterative 
release and install of application. 
Control Detailed and careful assessment 
of deliverables by SI. 
Ep13 Installation and testing several runs, testing R4P7, four new security errors and minor 
documentation changes. Two running patches allowed. 
Equivocation Some collaboration allowed by 
Agency for UserCo/Personsoft. 
En14 Agreement at production cutover meeting to joint install and the required priority fixes to 
enable IOC to continue. 
Equivocation/ 
Cooperative 
Some signs of Agency, SI and User 
exhaustion with process. 
Ep14 Repair and finalisation of priority fixes – including critical security deficiencies. Equivocation/ 
Cooperative 
Negotiation to offset fixes to next 
phase FOC. 
En15 Production installation and UAT acceptance with documented caveats. Equivocation Careful agreement and sign-off 
deliverables by UserCo/Agency. 
Ep15 Definition of contents for patch 8 rolling up all minor and significant deficiencies into two 
maintenance releases MR1 and MR2. 
Control Suppliers minimizing impact and 
offsetting to FOC. 
En16 Preliminary acceptance of application with the contracted commitments covering the 
maintenance releases for post IOC. 
Control Negotiation on scope and 
whether to move directly to FOC. 
Ep16 Preparation of closing of IOC by suppliers specifying post IOC deficiency correction for 
inclusion in acceptance documentation. 
Control Negotiation to gain acceptance 
with minimal re-work. 
En17 Acceptance by Agency of IOC release. (formal written preliminary system acceptance PSA 
occurred 8 months later this trigged IOC payment) 
Control Detailed evaluation of SOW 
against delivery. 
Legend: En: Encounters – Interactions interrupting or framing episodes, Ep: Episodes – periods of development activity 
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